Technological evolution is leading telecommunications to all-IP networks where multiple services are transported as IP packets. Among these are the group communications services with confidentiality requirements. Secure IP multicast may be used to secure the broadcast of video channels. However, in scenarios such as cable TV where the concept of video channel and bundle are present, groups are very large, and users switch very rapidly between channels (zapping), a sort of problems still need to be addressed.
munications between each member and its GC. DEK is a key used to encrypt the group communications data and must be known by all the members of the group. In a re-key operation, for instance, the DEK may be securely transmitted by the GC to valid members in a message consisting of [{DEK} KEK1 , {DEK} KEK2 , ..., {DEK} KEKn ]. In this example, the notation {DEK} KEK1 means that the DEK is encrypted with the KEK of the first member, and n represents the number of receivers in the group.
Confidentiality requirements can be classified in four classes [12] : 1) nongroup confidentiality; 2) forward secrecy; 3) backward secrecy; 4) collusion resistance. The first class imposes that users that had never participated in the group should not access any cryptographic material. The second class imposes that a member departing from a group should stop receiving cryptographic material, therefore ensuring that this member is unable to decrypt group communications after leaving the group. The third class imposes that a receiver arriving to the group should not access previous cryptographic material, ensuring that this member is unable to decrypt past group communications. The last class imposes that current cryptographic material should not be inferable by non-members.
In [24] three approaches for key distribution were identified: centralized, distributed, and decentralized. More recently, Cao et al. [11] extended this classification and identified four schemes: simplest scheme, centralized scheme, decentralized scheme, and hierarchical scheme. The first scheme is a subset of the centralized approach; the centralized and the decentralized schemes are the centralized and the decentralized approaches respectively.
In this paper we adopt a classification that combines both classifications and comprises 4 types of key distribution: centralized, decentralized, distributed and hierarchical. The distributed type assumes that every member can participate in the key distribution, perform access control, and contribute to the generation of the group key. The group controller role is not usually present because the group keys are generated with contributions from all the members. Group Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange [26] is an example of the distributed type.
The hierarchical type assumes that users have not the same priorities and impose cryptographic access control to classes of users with different access levels. This type was firstly addressed in [2] where a hierarchical key assignment to users was adopted. An user belonging to a certain class can derive the cryptographic keys of lower class users. The hierarchical type presents the drawback of requiring extra computational power from the members, similarly to the distributed type.
In the decentralized type the group is split into subgroups, each having its manager. The subgroup manager generates the local encryption key and processes the local membership changes (subgroup member join/leave operations).
Iolus [19] , DEP [16] , MARKS [8] , IGKMP [17] , and Kronos [25] are examples of decentralized key distributions.
The distributed and hierarchical types seem inappropriate to the IPTV services. The distributed type is used by group members (users) to generate a key to encrypt group data. In IPTV services the keys are preferably generated by the service provider and members (users) take no part in the key generation process. The hierarchical type assumes that users are classified in terms of access rights, meaning that users belonging to the high clearance class will be granted access to all information, and users belonging to the low clearance class will access only public information. In IPTV services, the video channel access is based upon service subscription and not on the data classification.
On the other hand, both the centralized and decentralized types are suitable for IPTV services. The decentralized type splits a group in sub-groups, giving each one a manager. In some sense, each sub-group becomes a centralized like solution.
Centralized type
This section surveys the centralized type of key distribution. For each solution, its functionality is described, the satisfaction of the confidentiality requirements is discussed, and the keying material used is presented.
The centralized type is characterized by the existence of a unique entity which manages the entire group. The Group Controller (GC) encrypts the DEK using each member's key (KEK i ) and then it transmits the n keys to the group members. Despite its simplicity, this scheme suffers from the single point of failure problem; in case of failure of the GC, the cryptographic material is not renewed and the new members become unable to receive the cryptographic material required to decrypt the data.
Logical Key Hierarchy (LKH)
In order to address problems such as key storage space and the support of highly dynamic groups, Wong et al. [30] proposed the use of a Logical Key Hierarchy (LKH). In LKH, the GC stores the keys in the form of a balanced tree of keys whose leafs are the individual member KEKs and the intermediate nodes represent other KEKs required by the members. An example of such a tree is shown in Figure 1 . The root of the tree holds the group DEK K. When a new member joins the tree, it is added as a leaf to the tree and all the keys in the path from its parent node to the root are changed. These keys will then be used by the new member to obtain the group key, i.e. the root of the tree.
The groups with high rates of member departure and arrival can be supported by using these trees, since only the affected keys are refreshed.
Upon a group change, the DEK K must be refreshed in order to maintain future and backward secrecy. For instance, the join operation of the member U d , shown in the Figure 1, 
This method generates a large number of re-keying messages. For a group of n users with a tree of height h, the total number of keys that needs to be maintained by all elements is 2n − 1; the number of keys stored by each user is equal to its distance to the root of the tree (h + 1 keys). Upon a join operation (2h − 1) + (h + 1) keys must be refreshed; upon a leave operation 2h keys must be refreshed.
One-way Function Tree (OFT)
The solution proposed by Waldvogel et al [29] is similar to LKH, differing only in the join operations. Instead of generating and sending new keys, the solution makes use of one-way functions over the keys that must be changed. If a receiver knows of the current keys, it will be able to generate the new keys. This algorithm is also referred in literature as LKH+.
Upon a group change, and in order to maintain future and backward secrecy, each member must calculate the new key for each node in the path from its parent's node to the root. This strategy reduces the number of re-keying messages to half, but it substitutes the message cost by a computational cost.
For a group of n users with a tree of height h, the total number of keys that needs to be maintained by all elements is 2n − 1; the number of keys stored by each user is h + 1. Upon a join operation 2(h + 1) keys must be refreshed; upon a leave operation h + 1 keys must be refreshed. 
One-way Function Chain Tree (OFCT)
Canneti et al. [10] proposed another variation of OFT that consists in using pseudo-random number generators instead of one-way functions; these generators are used to derive new KEKs from the current ones, and they are used For a group of n users with a tree of height h, the total number of keys that needs to be maintained by all elements is 2n − 1; the number of keys stored by each user is h + 1. Upon a join operation h + 1 keys must be refreshed; upon a leave operation h + 1 keys must be refreshed.
Efficient Large-group Key (ELK)
ELK [20] proposed another variant of OFT that uses Pseudo Random Functions.
ELK addresses large groups and it enables the group members to update all the keys either upon group membership changes or periodically.
Each group member generates the key of each tree node based on contribu- tions from the left and right child keys. Upon a member leave operation, the tree requires rearranging. Assuming the leave operation shown in Figure 1 , the resulting tree would be similar to the tree shown in Figure 3 , where K cd is eliminated and a new key K ′ is generated from K ab and K c ; in order to do it, the GC calculates the left and right child node contributions of K ′ and sends the left contribution to U c , and the right contribution to users U a and U b . A second property of ELK consists in allowing members to generate new keys using hints that are appended to data packets. For a group of n users with a tree of height h, the total number of keys that needs to be maintained by all elements is 2n−1; the number of keys stored by each user is h + 1. Upon a join operation h + 1 keys must be refreshed; upon a leave operation h keys must be refreshed.
LKH++
LKH++ was proposed in [21] and it exploits one-way hash functions in combination with information already shared by the users, namely the keys belonging to the common tree nodes in the path from the users to the root. Considering the scenario of Figure 1 , U a and U b share the keys K ab and K, for instance.
These shared keys are passed through one-way hash functions in order to gen-erate the new keys. In particular, upon a user leave operation, the users that share some part of the tree with the leaving user may autonomously generate the new keys in the path toward the root, thus reducing the number of re-keying messages generated by the GC.
For a group of n users with a tree of height h, the total number of keys that needs to be maintained by all elements is 2n − 1; the number of keys stored by each user is h + 1. Upon a join operation h + 1 keys must be refreshed; upon a leave operation h + 1 keys must be refreshed. 
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Proposed solution
The reference scenario adopted for this work is shown in Figure 4 and it describes an IPTV service, where multiple video channels are distributed as IP packets in multicast (one multicast group per video channel). In common IPTV services, multiple video channels are grouped together in bundles and may be distributed to a group of receivers with equal access to the video channels of the bundle.
A bundle is then composed of several video channels, each video channel being transmitted to a different multicast address. In what concerns security, common IPTV services use one key for each bundle. In our solution, we will explore a concept that, besides the bundle key, each channel will also have one data key.
The video channels are generated by one or more Video Servers (VS) to groups of Set-Top Boxes (STB). The requirements identified for this system include:
1. Individual user access control;
2. Support for legacy end-systems; 3. Transparent operation over existing networks and network equipments;
4. Low consumption of network resources;
5. Support for rapid switching between video channels; 6. Scalability.
The first requirement imposes that a user must not derive or obtain the cryptographic materials from other users. The second requirement imposes Table 2 : Notation adopted for specifying the SMIz protocol 
Protocol specification
The notation adopted to describe the proposed solution is shown in Table 2 .
A, B and C represent the communicating nodes, being the STB, GC, and VS, respectively. K ab represents a symmetric key previously shared between the nodes A and B; N a represents a nonce generated by node A; H(M ) represents the output of an hash function of input data M ; {M } K represents M encrypted with the key K; and SEK i represents the current SEK of communicating node A. Table 3 outlines the proposed protocol, which consists of four distinct phases.
The first phase (Bootstrap) reflects a STB bootstrap procedure and enables mutual authentication by means of a symmetric pre-shared key (K ab ) between the STB and the GC. In this phase, the initiator is the STB and it starts by sending a message composed of the initiator's identification (A), the result of an hash function of a fresh nonce (N a ), and a set of 3 fields encrypted with a preshared symmetric key (K ab ). The encrypted set is composed of the initiator's identification (A), the fresh nonce (N a ), and a time seed (T s1 ). The GC will decrypt this set, using the initiator's identification to select the correct preshared key, and test both the nonce and the time seed against previous values.
The GC will reply with a similar message that, besides the identification of the GC (B), contains a fresh nonce (N b ) generated at the GC and its time seed (T s2 ).
The STB will verify the nonce and time seed. Upon successful verification, the STB will reply with a new message composed of the identification of both, the result of an hash function of both nonces, and a new time seed (T s3 ), and a new encrypted set of fields. This set of fields is composed of the identifications A and B, the time seed T s3 , and an hash result. In turn, and upon successful verification, the GC will reply with a message that differs only in the encrypted set of fields, which contains a new time seed generated at the GC and a new SEK for that specific STB (SEK i ). At the end of the bootstrap phase, the STB will be in possession of its new SEK i and no other entity, besides GC, knows
The nonce and time seeds verification are executed by both GC and STB.
The nonce verification consists in verifying that a nonce was not previously used.
With respect to the time seed verification, time seeds must be higher than the last time seeds exchanged. For instance, in the GC case, a newly exchanged time seed must be higher than the T s3 from a previous STB bootstrap. The protocol security verification (see Section 3.2) assures that an intruder tracking the time seeds of both STBs and GC is unable to thwart security. The GC and STBs clocks do not need to be fully synchronized, it is only required that future time seeds must have a higher value than previous ones. The time seeds (T s1 through Before receiving the multicast transmission of the requested video channel, the STB must send an IGMP join message to its designated multicast router.
The destination address of this join request is the group address assigned to the video channel the user wants to receive. Each video channel is transmitted to its multicast group address in the form of Secure Real-time Transport Protocol (SRTP) packets, encrypted with a VEK. The fourth phase of Table 3 represents the VEK refresh, also referred to as VEK announce. The VEKs are sent periodically by the VS, in multicast, to the same IP multicast group address of the video stream, but to a different UDP port. The VEK is encrypted with the KEK of the bundle. We recall that there is one KEK for each bundle.
The STB decrypts the VEK with the KEK, and then decrypts the video channel stream with the VEK. To ensure a high level of security, all cryptographic keys must be refreshed periodically. These key refresh operations (rekeys) must not interfere with the video channel visualization of current receivers.
For that purpose, each VEK is associated to a channel context (ChCT X) that contains a maximum SRTP packet sequence number, after which the VEK is no longer valid. The ChCT X also contains the video channel SSRC identifier, a 64 bitmap used by SRTP to prevent replay attacks, and the number of times this bitmap as reached its maximum value (roll-over counter).
The SEK is renewed upon each STB bootstrap. The KEKs are sent periodically by the GC to all STB, in unicast, prior to their expiration and are used to protect a bundle; as a fall back procedure, the STB is also able to request the The main difference between our solution and existing secure IP multicast solutions is that our solution uses two types of cryptographic keys: bundle keys (KEKs), and video channel encryption keys (VEKs). The usage of two type of keys leads to low overheads since low bandwidths are required for video encryption and signaling; more importantly, this bandwidth is kept constant (e.g. one VEK announce every 100 ms) and independent of the groups size and of the number of users in in-bundle zapping. Our solution is also proved to not impact on the channel access delay, which is kept low; this characteristic comes from the multicast strategy used to announce VEKs. In-bundle zapping has time-limited channel access delays (e.g. 100 ms); out-of-bundle channel access delays are also kept low by enabling the STBs to cache the KEKs until the next KEK refresh interval, independently of the channel being received by the STB.
Security analysis
The Automated Validation of Internet Security Protocols (AVISPA) [3] tool was used to perform the security validation of the protocol proposed.
AVISPA
The AVISPA tool enables the automated validation of security protocols described in High Level Protocol Specification Language (HLPSL) [13] . AVISPA converts the HLPSL specification language to an intermediate format, usable by multiple verification tools embedded in AVISPA. HLPSL, in turn, has the expressiveness required to describe both the protocol behavior and the security properties it must satisfy, such as secrecy and authentication.
The attacker model adopted by AVISPA is the Dolev-Yao intruder model [15] . This model is characterized by the intruder being in complete control of the network, meaning that the intruder is capable of intercepting all the messages in the network, replaying previous messages, and generating its own messages based on any part of the intruder knowledge. that the security properties are not compromised by imposing constraints over the intruder knowledge. The SATMC [4] technique creates a propositional formula encoding possible attacks on the protocol and validates it using a SAT solver. The TA4SP [7] technique validates security protocols by over-estimating or under-estimating the intruder knowledge through the use of regular tree de-scription languages, and then by checking on the reachability of such states.
HLPSL specification
The automated security verification with AVISPA demands the specification of the environment and the specification of security goals. The environment in HLPSL is a top-level role consisting of a set of protocol sessions, each session being described by the involved participants and their shared knowledge, if any.
The security goals supported by HLPSL are secrecy and authentication. the intruder impersonates either of the honest participants (lines 9 and 10). As initial knowledge, we assume the intruder knows the honest participants, and that it has a cryptographic key that was pre-shared with the GC. In this way, it is possible to verify the protocol security even when the intruder is a legitimate user, but tries to impersonate other users. 
Listing 2: Security goals specification
Listing 2 is an excerpt of our protocol specification that shows our definition of security goals. These goals are the secrecy of SEK (lines 8 and 12), and the ability of SEK to serve has an authentication token (lines 3, 7, and 13) between the participating entities. The secrecy (line 12) says that anytime the intruder obtains the SEK, and it is not an explicit secret between the intruder and the GC, then we are in presence of an attack. The authentication goal (line 13) is used to verify that a STB is right in believing that its GC has reached a specific state, associated with the current session, and that GC agrees on that specific SEK.
We performed the security verification with all four techniques available in AVISPA. None of them was able to find an attack to our protocol. For the specific case of the TA4SP technique, the result was considered inconclusive:
when executed by under approximation, the protocol is reported as unsafe because the intruder may know some critical information; when executed by over approximation, the TA4SP reports a safe protocol. 
Results
In order to validate the solution proposed, a prototype was also developed and 
Experimental results
The testbed implemented and used to obtain experimental results is represented in Figure 6 . It consists of 3 computers interconnected through an Ethernet hub.
All the computers have the same hardware and software characteristics, namely the Fedora Core Linux operating system, an 3000+ AMD Athlon 64 processor and 1GB of RAM memory.
The first experimental test address the STB bootstrap phase, described in Table 3 . It consists on stressing the server regarding the bootstrap phase. The GC was setup in M1, and the test consisted in mutual authentication and on the SEK exchange, between GC and STB. STB was setup in M2. As a result, the GC was able to correctly process an average 839 requests per second.
The second experimental test focused on stressing the server regarding the The third experiment focused on the time required by a STB to obtain both KEK and VEK, which are both required to decrypt a video channel. VEK announce intervals of 500 and 100 ms were assumed. A simplified state machine of this procedure in ST B i is shown in Figure 7 , and it assumes that the STB is already in possession of its SEK. Here, ! and ? represent respectively the transmission and the reception of messages. The GC was setup in M2, the STB was setup in M3, and the VS in M1. Each test was executed 8 times for each VEK re-key interval. The results obtained are presented in Table 5 ,
where the values represent the time, in ms, since the STB switches for a new channel (join operation) until it receives the VEK and it can start decrypting the new TV channel. From Table 5 we can also observe that for re-key intervals of 500 and 100 ms, a mean number of 55 and 11 SRTP packets are transmitted, respectively. 
Bandwidth usage analysis
The KEK refresh (phase 3 of Table 3 ) is the operation which may affect the performance of our solution, since it is carried by an unicast UDP packet per subscriber and per KEK re-key interval; the bandwidth required for KEK rekey grows linearly with the group size. bits. OFT, LKH, and LKH++ bandwidth usage were estimated based on the join re-key message sizes shown in Table 1 and for the same re-key period and key size. We assume a tree height equal to log 2 (n), n being the group size. Figure 11 shows the bandwidth spent in signaling when 10% of the existing STBs are zapping through channels. Our solution (the SMIz curve) is characterized by constant and low signalling in scenarios were the users zapp through channels within the same bundle. In Figure 11 we have also considered two scenarios where both VEK and KEK re-keys were required. These scenarios appear when users switch between channels belonging to different bundles. The 
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Scalability
Simulation and experimental results demonstrate that our solution supports large group sizes of up to 1 million members without having impact on users rapidly switching between channels. The reduction of signalling was the key issues of our solution, thus the scalability of the proposed solution was left for future work. In order to increase the scalability of the proposed solution, the rekey intervals for both SEK and KEK may be extended; meaning that the same amount of signalling would be required by larger groups. The re-key interval increase also means that keys are refreshed less often, resulting in a less secure system.
Another possibility to improve the scalability of the proposed solution consists in decentralizing the GC functionality. Assuming the existence of two GC, then the proposed solution would support two million users, demanding the same level of network resources while using the same re-key intervals. In this case, service availability is also extended as the proposed solution depends on a single entity, the GC. If it is the case of having two GC, upon a GC failure, only the STBs associated with such GC would be denied service access.
Conclusion
In this paper we proposed a centralized secure group communication solution used to transmit, not data, but group cryptographic material that is used by members to decrypt the group data. The solution was defined for a real-time multi-channel IPTV service. The solution's main advantage over existing solutions is the low use of bandwidth for signaling in zapping scenarios. Moreover, our solution has proved to not significantly impact on the time required for group join operations. Using the proposed solution, an user is able to switch between channels with a delay which is equivalent to the delay in traditional analogue TV provided over cable. The prototype implemented has shown to scale up to one million of users.
